DISSENTING OPINIONS OF JUDGES
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT
The concept of disagreement should be the key category for the jurisprudence, since law isconsidered to be a tool for dispute resolution. This concept has been examined so far mainly from the perspective of the features of the relation being the subject of disagreement (questionis iuris, questionis facti). Theoretical implications or assumptions of agent-oriented approach have been neglected so far. This paper presents the key claims in the recently emerging field of metaphilosophy, i.e. epistemology of disagreement. One of the main problems being discussed is a question about a rational strategy in the case of epistemic peer disagreement: should a given belief be suspended (skeptical strategy) in such case or, rather, the fact of peer disagreement is not epistemically relevant.
An effort is made, eventually, to look at the situation of dissenting opinions in court from the perspective of epistemology of disagreement.