FACTS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT AS THE SUBJECT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PRESUMPTION IN THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
The fundamental problem of the article can be expressed in two sequentially asked questions, namely — firstly — whether the subject of substantive presumption may be not only facts, but also assessments formulated on their basis, and — secondly — whether in the case of limiting the essence of presumptions exclusively to facts, it would be possible to include (into the presumptions) these elements of the dogmatic structure of crime, the occurrence of which requires, first and foremost, a series of normative assessments based on normative criteria. It is diffi cult to imagine a situation in which a subject reconstructing reality would make the subject of presumption, and therefore only “guess” that he values its elements. It would have to mean that the court must use a presumption to assess whether the realization of the signs of a prohibited act was socially harmful, unlawful and culpable. A constitutional principle of the presumption of innocence, according to which the accused should be regarded as innocent until his guilt is proved and confi rmed by a valid sentence, does not authorize to conclude that the evidence emerging from successively collected evidence indicates innocence, but it only means that before the fi nal termination of the proceedings, there is no factual and legal basis for verifying the fault and bringing to criminal responsibility.